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  WHEN IN ROME: 
 AIDING AND ABETTING IN 
WANG XIAONING V. YAHOO 
INTRODUCTION 
n April 2007, Wang Xiaoning, a Chinese dissident, filed suit against 
Yahoo! Inc. and certain subsidiaries (“Yahoo”) under the Alien Tort 
Claims Act (“ATCA”).1 The suit alleged that Yahoo aided and abetted 
the Chinese government in the torture, cruel and degrading treatment, 
arbitrary arrest, and prolonged detention of Wang.2 Through a Yahoo 
group that permitted him to post anonymously, Wang posted several ar-
ticles online criticizing the Chinese government and calling for demo-
cratic reform in China.3 After Yahoo provided information to the Chinese 
government on the Yahoo account used to publish the articles, the gov-
ernment was able to identify Wang as the author of the postings.4 Wang 
was subsequently sentenced to ten years in prison for inciting subversion, 
and he claims that he has since been repeatedly beaten and tortured in the 
labor camp where he is currently held.5 Wang sued Yahoo for damages 
and an injunction to prevent Yahoo from providing identifying informa-
tion in the future on accounts being used to call for democratic reform in 
China.6 When questioned, spokespersons for Yahoo maintained that as a 
condition of doing business, it is bound to comply with the local laws 
where it operates.7 In November 2007, however, Yahoo settled with 
Wang for an undisclosed amount.8 
This Note examines the ATCA claims filed against Yahoo and eva-
luates Wang’s likelihood of success had the case proceeded to trial, in 
light of several standards the federal courts have articulated to determine 
aiding and abetting liability for multinational corporations. In particular, 
federal courts have taken notice of the international criminal aiding and 
                                                                                                             
 1. “The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil action by an alien 
for a tort only, committed in violation of the law of nations or a treaty of the United 
States.” Alien Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2006). 
 2. Second Amended Complaint para. 10, Wang Xiaoning v. Yahoo! Inc., No. C07-
02151 CW (N.D. Cal. July 30, 2007) (Justia), http://casedocs.justia.com/california/candce/ 
4:2007cv02151/191339/51/0.pdf [hereinafter Complaint]. 
 3. Miguel Helft, Chinese Political Prisoner Sues in U.S. Court, Saying Yahoo 
Helped Identify Dissidents, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 19, 2007, at C4. 
 4. Ariana Eunjung Cha & Sam Diaz, Advocates Sue Yahoo in Chinese Torture Case, 
WASH. POST, Apr. 19, 2007, at D1. 
 5. Eunjung Cha & Diaz, supra note 4. 
 6. Helft, supra note 3. 
 7. Id. 
 8. Catherine Rampell, Yahoo Settles with Chinese Families, WASH. POST, Nov. 14, 
2007, at D4. 
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abetting standard articulated by international military tribunals during the 
war crimes trials at Nuremberg.9 These trials may provide the courts with 
guidance on how to analyze ATCA aiding and abetting claims.10 
Part I of this Note provides background on Yahoo’s involvement in 
China, the U.S. government’s response to the involvement of Internet 
companies in China, and Wang Xiaoning’s suit against Yahoo. Part II 
briefly outlines the development of ATCA claims in general and against 
multinational corporations in particular, with a focus on civil aiding and 
abetting claims. Part III discusses the aiding and abetting criminal liabili-
ty standard that was prominently established during the trials at Nurem-
berg and further developed by the tribunals in the former Yugoslavia and 
Rwanda. Part IV evaluates Wang’s likelihood of success had the case 
gone to trial. Part V concludes that a court would have found Yahoo lia-
ble for aiding and abetting if the court applied the Nuremberg standard 
for criminal liability for aiding and abetting as it has developed over the 
last twenty years, and Wang could have proven that Yahoo turned over 
the identifying details on Wang’s account knowing the government was 
looking to prosecute a dissident. 
I. BACKGROUND 
A. Yahoo 
It is not difficult to understand why multinational Internet corporations 
are anxious to establish business operations in China. The China Internet 
Network Information Center estimates that there are 253 million Internet 
users in China, recently surpassing the United States.11 Several major 
corporations involved in providing services related to the Internet are 
already doing business in China, among them Google, Cisco, Microsoft, 
and Yahoo.12 But the Chinese government imposes a number of condi-
                                                                                                             
 9. See, e.g., Khulumani v. Barclay Nat’l Bank Ltd, 504 F.3d 254, 271 (2d Cir. 2007) 
(per curium), aff’d due to lack of a quorum sub. nom, Am. Isuzu Motors, Inc. v. Ntsebeza, 
128 S. Ct. 2424 (2008) (recognizing that the principles established by the International Mili-
tary Tribunal are significant due to their “broad acceptance” and because they “were 
viewed as reflecting and crystallizing preexisting customary international law”). 
 10. See, e.g., Doe I v. Unocal, 395 F.3d 932, 950 (9th Cir. 2002), reh’g en banc 
granted, 395 F.3d 978 (9th Cir. 2003), appeal dismissed, 403 F.3d 708 (9th Cir. 2005) 
(finding the ICTY and the ICTR “especially helpful” in considering the standard to use 
for civil aiding and abetting liability). 
 11. David Barboza, China Surpasses U.S. in Number of Internet Users, N.Y. TIMES, 
July 28, 2008, at C3. 
 12. Nicholas D. Kristof, Op-Ed., China’s Cyberdissidents and the Yahoos at Yahoo, 
N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 19, 2006, at D13. Unlike Yahoo and Microsoft, which both provide 
email and blogging accounts, Google decided that it would only offer a search engine to 
2008] WHEN IN ROME 153 
tions on these companies before it will allow them to establish business 
in the country. By agreement, corporations are required to censor content 
that “damages the honor or interests of the state” or “disturbs the public 
order or destroys public stability.”13 The government, however, does not 
provide a list of what must be censored and intentionally leaves the 
wording of this agreement unclear so that the corporations themselves 
are required to interpret what must be censored.14 
In 1999, Yahoo was the first multinational Internet corporation to enter 
the market in China when it established a Beijing office and started the 
Chinese equivalent of its search engine.15 Yahoo voluntarily signed a 
“self-discipline” pledge in 2002, promising to follow the vague censor-
ship laws in China.16 The pledge requires its signatories to “refrain[] 
from producing, posting, or disseminating pernicious information that 
may jeopardize state security and disrupt social stability, contravene laws 
and regulations and spread superstition and obscenity.”17 In a letter in 
response to inquiries from Human Rights Watch, an international human 
rights group, Yahoo stated, “The pledge involved all major Internet com-
panies in China and was a reiteration of what was already the case—all 
Internet companies in China are subject to Chinese law, including with 
respect to filtering and information disclosure.”18 Human Rights Watch 
noted that while this statement was accurate at the time Yahoo was asked 
to sign, neither Microsoft nor Google has since signed the pledge.19 
                                                                                                             
Chinese residents when it entered the market, precisely because it did not want to be put 
in a position where it might have to censor its bloggers’ writings or turn over identifying 
information to the Chinese police that could lead to their imprisonment. Google also noti-
fies users when certain results have been omitted due to Chinese law, so that they are at 
least made aware that the censorship has occurred. See Clive Thompson, Google’s China 
Problem (and China’s Google Problem), N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 23, 2006, § 6 (Magazine), at 
64. 
 13. Thompson, supra note 12. 
 14. Id. 
 15. Id. 
 16. HUM. RTS. WATCH, RACE TO THE BOTTOM: CORPORATE COMPLICITY IN CHINESE 
INTERNET CENSORSHIP, Aug. 9, 2006, at 30, http://www.hrw.org/reports/2006/china0806/ 
china0806web.pdf [hereinafter RACE TO THE BOTTOM]. 
 17. Internet Society of China, Public Pledge of Self-Regulation and Professional Eth-
ics for China Internet Industry, http://www.isc.org.cn/20020417/ca102762.htm (last vi-
sited Oct. 5, 2008). 
 18. RACE TO THE BOTTOM, supra note 16, at 125. 
 19. Id. at 31. 
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B. Response of the U.S. Government 
Concern about the consequences of suppression of speech in China 
roused both the U.S. Congress and the executive branch to gather infor-
mation about the business of multinational Internet corporations with 
operations in China and headquarters in the United States. In February 
2006, the State Department announced the establishment of the Global 
Internet Freedom Task Force.20 The purpose of the Task Force is to 
“maximize freedom of expression and the free flow of information and 
ideas, to minimize the success of repressive regimes in censoring and 
silencing legitimate debate, and to promote access to information and 
ideas over the Internet.”21 
Congress has also held several hearings on the matter. On February 15, 
2006, representatives of Google, Microsoft, Cisco, and Yahoo appeared 
before the House Subcommittee on Africa, Global Human Rights and 
International Operations.22 The House Subcommittee was particularly 
concerned about the plight of journalist Shi Tao,23 who was imprisoned 
for sending notice overseas that the Chinese government warned journal-
ists against any coverage of the anniversary of the Tiananmen Square 
massacre.24 Yahoo provided the Chinese government with information 
showing that Shi had used his email account at his place of business to 
                                                                                                             
 20. Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of State, Secretary of State Establishes New Global 
Internet Freedom Task Force (Feb. 14, 2006). 
 21. Fact Sheet, U.S. Dep’t of State, Global Internet Freedom Task Force (GIFT) 
Strategy: A Blueprint for Action (Dec. 28, 2006), http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/78340.htm. 
 22. Tom Zeller Jr., Online Firms Facing Questions about Censoring Internet 
Searches in China, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 15, 2006, at C3. 
 23. In May 2007, Shi Tao joined Wang Xiaoning’s suit against Yahoo as a plaintiff. 
Nate Anderson, Second Chinese Dissident Joins Lawsuit Against Yahoo, ARS TECHNICA, 
May 30, 2007, http://arstechnica.com/news.ars/post/20070530-second-chinese-dissident-
joins-lawsuit-against-yahoo.html. While this Note does not review the specific facts sur-
rounding his online advocacy for democratic reform and subsequent imprisonment, his 
case is substantially similar to Wang Xiaoning’s, in that he was a journalist who criti-
cized the Chinese government and was later imprisoned after Yahoo provided informa-
tion tying him to an anonymous email sent overseas. For further details on the imprison-
ment of Shi Tao, see Complaint, supra note 2, paras. 52–68. 
 24. The Internet in China: A Tool for Freedom or Suppression?: Joint Hearing Be-
fore the Subcomm. on Africa, Global Human Rights and International Operations and the 
Subcomm. on Asia and the Pacific of the H. Comm. on International Relations, 109th 
Cong. 38 (2006) [hereinafter Hearing] (prepared statement of James R. Keith, Senior 
Advisor for China and Mongolia, Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs, U.S. Depart-
ment of State). 
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notify others of the warning.25 Representative Chris Smith, the Chairman 
of the Subcommittee, began the hearing by referencing the Holocaust, 
where multinational corporations offered technology to the Third Reich 
that enabled human rights abuses.26 Representative Tom Lantos, himself 
a Holocaust survivor, demanded to know whether the companies were 
“ashamed” of their contributions to censorship and, in Yahoo’s case, to 
the imprisonment of Chinese dissidents.27 The companies generally re-
sponded by noting that while they were “deeply concerned”28 by the 
strictures in China, the country has become a “more open societ[y]” since 
it has gained access to the Internet.29 Additionally, they emphasized that 
China would become more tightly controlled if non-Chinese companies 
were forced to leave.30 Finally, they pointed out that the censorship filters 
do not always block all the content that the Chinese government does not 
want its citizens to see.31 
Following the House Subcommittee hearing, Representative Smith  
introduced a bill called the Global Online Freedom Act of 2006, the pur-
                                                                                                             
 25. James Heffernan, An American in Beijing: An Attorney’s Ethical Considerations 
Abroad with a Client Doing Business with a Repressive Government, 19 GEO. J. LEGAL 
ETHICS 721, 721 (2006). 
 26. Hearing, supra note 24, at 2 (statement of Rep. Christopher H. Smith, Chairman, 
Subcomm. on Africa, Global Human Rights and International Operations). 
 27. Joe Nocera, Enough Shame to Go Around on China, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 18, 2006, 
at C1. 
 28. Hearing, supra note 24, at 60 (testimony of Jack Krumholtz, Managing Director 
of Federal Government Affairs and Associate General Counsel, Microsoft Corp.). 
 29. Id. at 56 (testimony of Michael Callahan, Senior Vice President and General 
Counsel, Yahoo! Inc.). Advocates for multinational Internet corporations are not the only 
ones to argue that regardless of the efforts it makes to stifle dissent, the Chinese govern-
ment will be unable to slow the forces of democratic change now that the Internet is rea-
dily available to its citizens. Even when it shuts down the blog of one prominent dissi-
dent, there are now so many citizens using the Web to post their writings that the Internet 
in China has become a “censor’s nightmare.” Howard W. French, Despite Web Crack-
down, Prevailing Winds are Free, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 9, 2006, at A4. Of course, this argu-
ment ignores the consequences of imprisonment and torture for those individuals unfor-
tunate enough to be identified and prosecuted by the government for voicing their dissent. 
Also, the idea that China has become freer through the investment of foreign corporations 
is not a given: “[b]ecause China is too lucrative a market to resist, American and Euro-
pean businessmen have ended up endorsing the party line through their silence—or 
worse. They are not molding China; China is molding them.” Tina Rosenberg, Editorial, 
Building the Great Firewall of China, with Foreign Help, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 15, 2005, at 
D11. 
 30. Hearing, supra note 24, at 78 (testimony of Mark Chandler, Vice President and 
General Counsel, Cisco Systems, Inc.). 
 31. Id. at 63 (prepared statement of Jack Krumholtz, Managing Director of Federal 
Government Affairs and Associate General Counsel, Microsoft Corporation). 
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pose of which was to “promote freedom of expression on the Internet” 
and “protect [U.S.] businesses from coercion to participate in repression 
by authoritarian foreign governments.”32 The bill did not move beyond 
the Subcommittee vote before the 109th Session of Congress ended,33 
and Representative Smith reintroduced the bill as the Global Online 
Freedom Act of 2007 in the 110th Session of Congress.34 In October 
2007, the House’s Committee on Foreign Affairs recommended that the 
entire House consider the bill,35 but the Energy and Commerce Commit-
tee must still consider the bill.36 The bill is unlikely to gain enough sup-
port to pass given the significance of China to U.S. trade.37 
In August 2007, Representative Lantos, Chairman of the House Com-
mittee on Foreign Affairs, announced that he would conduct an investiga-
tion to find out whether Yahoo misled Congress when it testified before 
Congress in February 2006.38 Yahoo had testified that it had no informa-
tion about the reason for the investigation of journalist Shi Tao when it 
was asked to provide identifying information on his Yahoo account.39 
But the Dui Hua Foundation, which advocates for Chinese detainees in 
the United States and Hong Kong, uncovered a document establishing 
that the Chinese government provided Yahoo with a request for evidence 
in a case against Shi for “illegally providing state secrets to foreign enti-
                                                                                                             
 32. Global Online Freedom Act of 2006, H.R. 4780, 109th Cong. (2006). 
 33. Press Release, Representative Christopher H. Smith, House of Representatives, 
Smith Reintroduces the Global Online Freedom Act (Jan. 8, 2007). In the press release, 
Representative Smith stated, “American companies should not be working hand-in-glove 
with dictators. By blocking access to information and providing secret police with the 
technology to monitor dissidents, American IT companies are knowingly—and willing-
ly—enabling the oppression of millions of people.” Id. 
 34. Global Online Freedom Act of 2007, H.R. 275, 110th Cong. (2007). 
 35. Press Release, Representative Christopher H. Smith, House of Representatives, 
Global Online Freedom Act Passes Committee in Wake of Congressional Investigation of 
Yahoo (Oct. 23, 2007). 
 36. Brett Murphy, US House Committee Approves Personal Online Data Protection 
Bill, JURIST, Oct. 24, 2007, http://jurist.law.pitt.edu/paperchase/2007/10/us-house-committee-
approves-online.php. 
 37. “Congress could certainly pass a law forbidding technology companies from 
doing business in China just as it once prohibited trade with South Africa, and still ban 
commerce with countries like Cuba and Burma. But it won’t. Ever since the Nixon ad-
ministration, the government has consistently believed that engaging with China was 
better than not . . . .” Nocera, supra note 27. 
 38. Press Release, House Comm. on Foreign Affairs, Congressional Committee to 
Investigate Disparity Between Documents and Hearing Testimony by Yahoo (Aug. 3, 
2007). 
 39. Hearing, supra note 24, at 56 (testimony of Michael Callahan, Senior Vice Presi-
dent and General Counsel, Yahoo! Inc.). 
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ties.”40 Yahoo’s Chief Executive Officer Jerry Yang and Senior Vice 
President and General Counsel Michael Callahan were requested to testi-
fy at a hearing on November 6, 2007.41 At the hearing, Callahan admitted 
that, while he was unaware of it at the time of his initial testimony, the 
order for information about Shi Tao did contain a reference to an investi-
gation for disclosure of “state secrets.”42 “State secrets” is a term com-
monly understood to refer to investigations of political dissidents.43 
Meanwhile, multinational Internet companies continue to press the 
U.S. government to pursue legislative and diplomatic solutions that  
encourage freedom of expression on the Internet worldwide. At yet 
another hearing before Congress, Michael Samway, the Vice President 
and Deputy General Counsel of Yahoo, noted that Yahoo has requested 
that the government use its “trade relationships, bilateral and multilateral  
forums, and other diplomatic means” among repressive regimes to dis-
courage censorship on the Internet and otherwise.44 But the Internet 
                                                                                                             
 40. Congressional Committee to Investigate Disparity Between Documents and Hear-
ing Testimony by Yahoo, supra note 38. 
 41. Press Release, House Comm. on Foreign Affairs, Committee Asks Yahoo! Ex-
ecutives to Testify About False Information Given to Congress in China Human Rights 
Case (Oct. 16, 2007). 
 42. Yahoo’s Provision of False Information to Congress: Hearing Before the Comm. 
on Foreign Affairs, 110th Cong. 26 (2007) (prepared statement of Michael J. Callahan, 
General Counsel, Yahoo! Inc.) [hereinafter Yahoo Hearing]. Wang Xiaoning and Shi Tao 
settled their suit against Yahoo only one week after this Congressional hearing. Morton 
Sklar, the executive director of World Organization for Human Rights USA and lawyer 
for Wang and Shi in the lawsuit against Yahoo, stated, “The pressures by Congress on 
[Yahoo chief executive officer] Jerry Yang were of tremendous importance to making 
this settlement happen.” Rampell, supra note 8. For further description of the Shi Tao 
case, see supra note 23. 
 43. Yahoo Hearing, supra note 42, at 2 (statement of Rep. Tom Lantos, Chairman, 
House Comm. on Foreign Affairs). 
 44. Global Internet Freedom: Corporate Responsibility & the Rule of Law: Hearing 
Before the Subcomm. on Human Rights & the Law, 110th Cong. (2008) (opening state-
ment of Michael Samway, Vice President & Deputy General Counsel, Yahoo! Inc.). 
Samway noted that Yahoo CEO Jerry Yang met with State Department officials and 
wrote a letter to Secretary of State Condoleeza Rice, urging diplomatic efforts to encour-
age the release of Chinese political prisoners. Id. At the same hearing, Google Inc. Depu-
ty General Counsel Nicole Wong laid out several suggestions to “promote online freedom 
of expression.” Id. (testimony of Nicole Wong, Deputy General Counsel, Google Inc.). 
Among other things, Google suggested that the U.S. government “renew diplomatic ef-
forts to encourage [approximately thirty countries] to ratify the [International Covenant 
on Civil and Political Rights]”; “[s]trengthen and enhance the State Department’s Global 
Internet Freedom Taskforce”; “[s]trengthen individuals’ ability to file complaints under 
the International Covenant”; and “[p]romote free expression as part of foreign aid.” Id. 
For a historical view that the self-interest of corporations in the marketplace may pave the 
way to the creation of enforceable human rights legal standards, see Ralph G. Steinhardt, 
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companies have also begun to respond at least in part to the criticism that 
has been directed towards them for doing business with the Chinese  
government. In October 2008, companies, including Yahoo, Microsoft, 
and Google, several human rights organizations, scholars, and socially 
responsible investors reached an agreement on a voluntary code of con-
duct for use in countries like China to protect user privacy and encourage 
freedom of expression.45 
Due to its secrecy, it is difficult to get a true sense of the number of 
Chinese citizens significantly affected by the Chinese government’s actions 
in cases like Wang’s and Shi’s. The government shows no signs of abat-
ing its suppression of dissent. In fall 2007, it announced that it would 
continue to attack vigorously what it called “false news reports, unautho-
rized publications and bogus journalists,” and it promised to punish jour-
nalists and media organizations that were “intentionally fabricat[ing] 
news” and “tarnish[ing] the nation’s image.”46 Human Rights Watch re-
ported that in August 2007, the government ordered all search sites in the 
country, including the Chinese versions of the Google and Yahoo search 
sites, to take down any “illegal and unhealthy content” within a week, 
without providing substance on what this phrase might mean and without 
providing the consequences of failure to comply.47 
 
                                                                                                             
Soft Law, Hard Markets: Competitive Self-Interest and the Emergence of Human Rights 
Responsibilities for Multinational Corporations, 33 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 933 (2008). 
 45. Miguel Helft & John Markoff, Big Tech Companies Back Global Plan to Shield 
Online Speech, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 28, 2008, at B8. According to the final draft of docu-
ments obtained by the Times, the companies promise to “avoid or minimize the impact of 
government restrictions on freedom of expression.” Id.  
 46. Keith Bradsher, China Cracks Down on News Media as Party Congress Nears, 
N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 16, 2007, at A3. This “crackdown” coincided with growing worldwide 
concern about the quality controls around consumer products made in China as well as 
the nearing of the Chinese Community Party Congress, when the new party leadership 
was announced. See, e.g., David Barboza & Louise Story, Mattel Issues New Recall of 
Toys Made in China, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 14, 2007, at C2. The message from the govern-
ment did not concern dissent journalism directly, but due to the Chinese government’s 
increased focus on the image of the country around the world, journalists arguing for 
democratic reform are likely to feel the trickle-down effects of the ever-tightening con-
trols around what journalists may publish. 
 47. Press Release, Human Rights Watch, China: Media Freedom Attacks Continue 
Despite Pledges (Sept. 7, 2007). And despite the government’s assurances to the contrary, 
international media arriving in Beijing for the Olympics found that several websites were 
censored by the country’s firewall. After organizers of the Olympics met with senior 
members of the International Olympic Committee, some of the bans were lifted. Andrew 
Jacobs, Restrictions on Net Access in China Seem Relaxed, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 1, 2008, at 
A7. 
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C. Wang Xiaoning 
According to his complaint, Wang was the editor of and occasional 
contributor to two online journals that advocated for democratic reform 
in China.48 In 2000 and 2001, Wang posted his writings to a Yahoo 
Group, where users who subscribed could receive emails sent by other 
members of the group.49 After administrators came across the forbidden 
content in Wang’s writings, his ability to send new posts to the group 
was revoked; however, Wang continued to send his journal entries ano-
nymously to particular email addresses.50 
In September 2002, Chinese police allegedly arbitrarily detained Wang 
without informing him of the charges against him and seized evidence of 
his writings, including his computer and his notes.51 A year later, the  
Beijing Municipal First Intermediary People’s Court convicted Wang of 
“‘incitement to subvert state power,’ advocating the establishment of an 
alternative political party, and communicating with an overseas organiza-
tion the Chinese government considers ‘hostile.’”52 The government sen-
tenced him to ten years in prison.53 According to the complaint, the court 
stated that it was able to connect Wang to his writings due to the essen-
tial information that Yahoo Hong Kong provided to the Chinese police.54 
Specifically, Yahoo Hong Kong told the police that an email address 
based in China had been used to set up the Yahoo Group, and that the 
postings sent to the Yahoo Group were from an account in China that 
was owned by Wang Xiaoning.55 The court also included some of 
Wang’s statements from his Internet postings. In one posting, Wang 
                                                                                                             
 48. Complaint, supra note 2, para. 32. 
 49. Id. para. 33. 
 50. Id. paras. 34–35. The complaint does not identify whether the administrators who 
revoked Wang’s posting privileges were members of the Chinese government or em-
ployees of Yahoo. Id. 
 51. Id. para. 37. 
 52. Id. para. 40. 
 53. Id. para. 41. 
 54. Id. para. 42. Yahoo would have probably contested this point. In his prepared 
statement, Michael Callahan, General Counsel of Yahoo, emphatically denied that Yahoo 
Hong Kong had provided any information to the Chinese police about Shi Tao, another 
imprisoned Chinese dissident, and that Yahoo China alone would respond to a request 
from a law enforcement agency. Hearing, supra note 24, at 59 (prepared statement of 
Michael Callahan, Senior Vice President and General Counsel, Yahoo! Inc.). Also, Yahoo 
has been anxious to clarify that in October 2005, Yahoo China merged with Alibaba.com 
(a Chinese company), and Alibaba.com now owns the Yahoo China business. While 
Yahoo holds one of the four board seats on Alibaba.com and is a “large equity investor,” 
it does not maintain control over the day-to-day operations of Yahoo China. Id. at 58. 
 55. Complaint, supra note 2, para. 42. 
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stated, “Without the multi-party system, free elections and separation of 
powers, all types of political reform will come to nothing.” 56 In another, 
he wrote, “We should never forget that China is still a totalitarian and 
despotic country.”57 Wang appealed the judgment, but the Supreme 
People’s Court rejected the application for appeal in December 2004 and 
again in July 2006.58 
Wang has been held at the Detention Center of Beijing State Security 
Bureau as well as Beijing Prison No. 2.59 His complaint alleged that he 
has been subject to severe beatings and psychological torture to provoke 
him to confess to engaging in activities against the State,60 and that at 
times he has been malnourished and denied regular exercise and sunlight 
for weeks or months on end.61 He is allowed to see his wife for one half-
hour every month, and prison administration monitors his written com-
munications directed outside the prison.62 
In April 2007, Wang Xiaoning filed suit against Yahoo! Inc. and Ya-
hoo! Hong Kong, Ltd. under the ATCA, among other laws and treaties.63 
The specific violations of the law of nations alleged include knowingly 
aiding and abetting acts of torture64; cruel, inhuman, or degrading pu-
nishment or treatment65; and arbitrary arrest and prolonged detention.66 
The lawyer for the plaintiffs, Morton Sklar, is the executive director of 
World Organization for Human Rights USA.67 Had Wang’s suit not set-
tled, it would have been considered a test case, because the Supreme 
Court has not yet directly ruled on the applicability of the ATCA to mul-
tinational corporations for aiding and abetting violations of international 
law.68 
                                                                                                             
 56. Id. para. 43. 
 57. Id. 
 58. Id. para. 44. 
 59. Id. paras. 39, 44. 
 60. Id. para. 39. 
 61. Id. para. 45. 
 62. Id.  
 63. The suit also alleged violations of the Torture Victim Protection Act; Convention 
against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or Punishment; Inter-
national Covenant on Civil and Political Rights; Universal Declaration of Human Rights; 
Charter of the United Nations; International Labor Organization Convention No. 29 Con-
cerning Forced or Compulsory Labor; the Electronic Communications Privacy Act; and 
certain statutes and common law of the state of California. See id. para. 69. 
 64. Id. para. 74. 
 65. Id. para. 81. 
 66. Id. para. 88. 
 67. Helft, supra note 3. 
 68. In a discussion on how to judge whether a norm is “sufficiently definite” to be 
considered a violation of international law, Justice Souter, in the only Supreme Court 
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II. CLAIMS UNDER THE ATCA 
A. Introduction 
The ATCA was enacted as part of the Judiciary Act of 1789.69 There is 
intense disagreement over its original purpose and current appropriate 
application, in part due to the scant record left by Congress when the sta-
tute was drafted.70 In Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, Judge Bork con-
tended that the drafters of the ATCA had in mind only the violations of 
the law of nations existing at that time, including such torts as the viola-
tion of safe conduct, infringement of the rights of ambassadors, and piracy.71 
Bork concluded that the judiciary should not legislate from the bench on 
the meaning of the ATCA when Congressional intent is so unclear: 
[We] have, at the moment, no evidence what the intention of Congress 
was. When courts lack such evidence, to ‘construe’ is to legislate, to act 
in the dark, and hence to do many things that, it is virtually certain, 
Congress did not intend. Any correspondence between the will of Con-
gress in 1789 and the decisions of the courts in 1984 can then be only 
accidental. Section 1350 can probably be adequately understood only in 
the context of the premises and assumptions of a legal culture that no 
longer exists.72 
Others argue that the ATCA should receive a broad interpretation. The 
ATCA was drafted amidst Congressional concern that the U.S. govern-
ment, still in its very early stages, had no national law with which to en-
force the country’s obligations under international law, such as the obli-
                                                                                                             
opinion to directly address the ATCA, unfortunately provided little guidance on the ap-
plicability of the ATCA to private corporations: “A related consideration is whether in-
ternational law extends the scope of liability for a violation of a given norm to the perpe-
trator being sued, if the defendant is a private actor such as a corporation or individual.” 
Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 732 n.20 (2004). See infra note 99 and accom-
panying text. 
 69. Sosa, 542 U.S. at 712–13. 
 70. Id. at 718–19. 
 71. Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d 774, 813–14 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (Bork, 
J., concurring). See also JAMES BISER WHISKER, THE SUPREMACY OF THE STATE IN INTER-
NATIONAL LAW 128 (2003) (arguing that at the time it was enacted, the ATCA would 
have only allowed “an extremely limited number of highly specialized cases usually in 
regard to unusual offenses”). Others interpret the purpose of the ATCA even more nar-
rowly. See, e.g., Thomas H. Lee, The Safe Conduct Theory of the Alien Tort Statute, 106 
COLUM. L. REV. 830 (2006) (arguing that the ATCA was intended to cover violations of 
safe conduct only and that the ATCA should provide relief for torts committed by private 
individuals only if U.S. sovereign responsibility is implicated). 
 72. Tel-Oren, 726 F.2d at 815. 
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gation to protect ambassadors.73 When the first Congress enacted the  
Judiciary Act in 1789, it modeled the drafting on a 1781 resolution by the 
Continental Congress that was never passed.74 The 1781 resolution  
exhorted states to pass laws that would punish the “most obvious” viola-
tions of the law of nations, which Judge Bork referenced in Tel-Oren.75 
But it also asked states to grant courts jurisdiction “to decide on offenses 
against the law of nations, not . . . enumerat[ed]” and resolved that tort 
suits be authorized “for damages by the party injured.”76 Those who argue 
for a broad interpretation of the ATCA note that the drafters specifically 
chose to grant jurisdiction to all district courts as opposed to the Supreme 
Court alone, and that jurisdiction was granted for “all causes” rather than 
limited to specific violations of international law, such as infringement of 
the rights of ambassadors.77 
Filartiga v. Pena-Irala,78 a Second Circuit decision, brought the 
ATCA back to life after lying near dormant for close to two hundred 
years.79 This decision has been called the Brown v. Board of Education 
for transnational public law litigants.80 Filartiga held that the ATCA 
provides jurisdiction for violations of “universally accepted norms of the 
international law of human rights, regardless of the nationality of the par-
                                                                                                             
 73. Beth Stephens, Individuals Enforcing International Law: The Comparative and His-
torical Context, 52 DEPAUL L. REV. 433, 443–44 (2003) [hereinafter Stephens, Historical 
Context]. Stephens further argues that the First Congress, in enacting laws enabling both 
criminal and civil liability for violations of international law, allowed for a “mixed ap-
proach” that provided for “criminal prosecution of the perpetrator and compensation to 
those injured through a civil suit.” Id. at 444. 
 74. William R. Casto, The Federal Courts’ Protective Jurisdiction over Torts Com-
mitted in Violation of the Law of Nations, in THE ALIEN TORT CLAIMS ACT: AN ANALY-
TICAL ANTHOLOGY 119, 142 (Ralph G. Steinhardt & Anthony D’Amato eds., 1999). The 
First Congress drafted legislation on the issue of the violation of the law of nations some 
time after an infamous incident in 1784 involving an assault by a Frenchman, de Long-
champs, upon the Secretary of the French Legion on American soil. Since states alone 
held the lawmaking power at the time, the Continental Congress had no power that would 
allow for a federal remedy. Thus, the delegates at the Constitutional Convention and 
subsequently the First Congress were well aware of the need to provide legislation 
around violations of international law. Id. at 139–40. 
 75. Id. at 138 (citing 21 J. CONT. CONG. 1137 (1781)). 
 76. Id. 
 77. Id. at 146 (citing Judiciary Act § 9). 
 78. 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980). 
 79. See Frank Christian Olah, MNC Liability for International Human Rights Viola-
tions under the Alien Tort Claims Act: A Review & Analysis of the Fundamental Juri-
sprudence and a Look at Aiding & Abetting Liability under the Act, 25 QLR 751, 755 & 
n.19 (2007). 
 80. Harold Hongju Koh, Transnational Public Law Litigation, 100 YALE L.J. 2347, 
2366 (1991). 
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ties.”81 As long as there is “[1] an action by an alien, [2] for a tort only, 
[3] committed in violation of the law of nations,” a suit may be properly 
brought in district court.82 The Second Circuit further explained that the 
courts must carefully define the law of nations. If they failed to do so, 
“the courts of one nation might feel free to impose idiosyncratic legal 
rules upon others, in the name of applying international law.”83 
Since Filartiga, suits under the ATCA generally follow one of two 
routes: they are filed against either a State recognized by the United 
States (or persons acting in an official capacity for the State)84 or, as is 
more recently the case, persons acting in an individual capacity.85 Because 
courts had generally only applied international law to States,86 it was not 
clear that, when faced with the issue, courts would find private actors 
liable as well under the ATCA. Kadic v. Karadzic, decided in 1995, was 
one of the first cases to address whether a person acting in an individual 
capacity, not as a functionary of the State, could be held responsible for 
violations of the law of nations. Here, the Second Circuit found that the 
ATCA is applicable to private actors.87 Karadzic argued that only States 
and persons acting under color of law could be held liable for violations 
of international law, and that because he was a private individual, not a 
                                                                                                             
 81. Filartiga, 630 F.2d at 878. 
 82. Id. at 887 (explaining the elements for making out a tort violation under the 
ATCA). 
 83. Id. at 881. 
 84. Under the language of the statute, States are not exempt from suits under the 
ATCA. But generally, they have not been successfully named as defendants as a result of 
States’ general sovereign immunity to suits. See Beth Stephens, Judicial Deference and 
the Unreasonable Views of the Executive Branch, 33 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 773, 812 (2008) 
[hereinafter Stephens, Unreasonable Views]. Under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities 
Act of 1976, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1602–11 (2006), States and their instrumentalities are, subject 
to certain exceptions, immune from the jurisdiction of the court. And even when States 
are not immune to the court’s jurisdiction under the exceptions enumerated in the Foreign 
Sovereign Immunities Act, the act of state doctrine may cause the court to  
decline to review the legality of the State’s actions due to concerns about encroaching on 
the executive branch’s ability to set foreign policy. See, e.g., Banco Nacional de Cuba v. 
Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398 (1964). Indeed, in a footnote in Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, the 
court remarked that there was a “strong argument that federal courts should give serious 
weight to the [e]xecutive [b]ranch’s view of the case’s impact on foreign policy.” 542 
U.S. 692, 733 n.21 (2004). Another prudential doctrine that courts have indicated may 
limit their ability to adjudicate claims is when they are presented with a nonjusticiable 
political question. See, e.g., Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962). 
 85. GARY CLYDE HUFBAUER & NICHOLAS K. MITROKOSTAS, AWAKENING MONSTER: 
THE ALIEN TORT STATUTE OF 1789, at 4–5 (2003). 
 86. Olah, supra note 79, at 775. 
 87. Kadic v. Karadzic, 70 F.3d 232 (2d Cir. 1995). 
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state actor, he could not be sued under the ATCA.88 The court rejected 
this argument, asserting that “certain forms of conduct violate the law of 
nations whether undertaken by those acting under the auspices of a state 
or only as private individuals.”89 That is, there are certain universal 
norms that bind all entities, regardless of whether they are private indi-
viduals or state actors. For support, the court cited both the Restatement 
(Third) of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States,90 which pro-
vides for private actor liability for violations of certain universal norms, 
as well as offered historical examples of private actions that were consi-
dered violations of international law, such as piracy, the slave trade, and 
certain war crimes.91 
In 2004, the Supreme Court finally spoke on the ATCA in Sosa v.  
Alvarez-Machain.92 One of the issues before the Court was whether the 
ATCA was a jurisdictional statute only and thus “stillborn.”93 If it were 
solely jurisdictional, the statute would only enable litigants to bring 
claims once Congress provided a further private right of action through 
additional legislation, such as the Torture Victim Protection Act.94 The 
Sosa decision, however, did not interpret the statute to require further 
legislation. The Court recognized a private right of action for ATCA 
claims, but it defined the types of claims that can be brought under the 
ATCA relatively narrowly. First, the violation must be “definite” and 
“accept[ed] among civilized nations.”95 The Court cited to a concurring 
opinion in Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, in which Judge Edwards 
found that the ATCA only reaches “a handful of heinous actions—each 
of which violates definable, universal and obligatory norms.”96 And 
when laws or treaties do not clearly define a “violation of international 
law,” the Court stated that we should “look[] to those sources we have 
long, albeit cautiously, recognized,”97 including: 
                                                                                                             
 88. Id. at 239. 
 89. Id. 
 90. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED 
STATES pt. II, introductory note (1987) (“Individuals may be held liable for offenses 
against international law, such as piracy, war crimes, or genocide.”); id. § 404 (“A state 
has jurisdiction to define and prescribe punishment for certain offenses recognized by the 
community of nations as of universal concern . . . .”). 
 91. Karadzic, 70 F.3d at 239. 
 92. 542 U.S. 692 (2004). 
 93. Sosa, 542 U.S. at 714. 
 94. Torture Victim Protection Act of 1991, Pub. L. 102-256, 106 Stat. 73 (1992)  
(codified as a note to the ATCA, 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2006)). 
 95. Sosa, 542 U.S. at 732. 
 96. Id. 
 97. Id. at 733. 
2008] WHEN IN ROME 165 
customs and usages of civilized nations; and, as evidence of these, to 
the works of jurists and commentators . . . . Such works are resorted to 
by judicial tribunals, not for the speculations of their authors concern-
ing what the law ought to be, but for trustworthy evidence of what the 
law really is.98 
As to claims against multinational corporations, Sosa was almost si-
lent. In a footnote that left many wondering in what direction the Court 
would turn if faced with another ATCA claim, Justice Souter, writing for 
the majority, stated, “A related consideration is whether international law 
extends the scope of liability for a violation of a given norm to the perpe-
trator being sued, if the defendant is a private actor such as a corporation 
or individual.”99 He went on to cite disagreement amongst the circuits: in 
Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, the D.C. Circuit found that there was 
“insufficient consensus” in 1984 that private individuals could commit 
violations of international law; in Kadic v. Karadzic, the Second Circuit 
found that “sufficient consensus” existed in 1995.100 The Court took a 
misstep in not indicating at least in dicta whether ATCA claims against 
corporations are actionable, especially since this is one of the issues that 
has brought the most attention to the use of the ATCA in district 
courts.101 
By 2004, the decisions of most courts reflected a belief that, just like 
States, individuals and corporations could be held liable for grave viola-
tions of international law.102 Certainly the high profile of the Internation-
al Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (“ICTR”) and the International Tribun-
al for the Former Yugoslavia (“ICTY”) contributed to this view, but 
holding individuals responsible for violations of international law is not 
an innovation of the last twenty years. Under Article I, Section 8, of the 
Constitution, Congress is granted the power “[t]o define and punish Pira-
cies and Felonies committed on the high Seas, and Offenses against the 
Law of Nations.”103 Later, the trials at Nuremberg provided strong justi-
                                                                                                             
 98. Id. at 734 (citing The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 700 (1900)). Additionally, 
the Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law states that a rule of international law 
can be found derivatively by examining “general principles common to the major legal 
systems of the world.” RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE 
UNITED STATES § 102 (1987). Such principles “may be invoked as supplementary rules of 
international law where appropriate.” Id. 
 99. Id. at 732 n.20. 
 100. Id. 
 101. “Approximately one third of the post-Sosa cases involve corporate defendants.” 
Stephens, Unreasonable Views, supra note 84. 
 102. See infra note 125. 
 103. “Pirates, the very exemplar of intended defendants under Section 1350, were not 
always or necessarily considered ‘state actors,’ and there was never any question that 
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fication for applying international law to private actors as well as States. 
The United States Military Tribunal at Nuremberg convicted forty-three 
individual German citizens for crimes against humanity, including forced 
labor and enslavement in the individuals’ factories and mines.104 
While Sosa did not exactly throw the gates open for litigation under the 
ATCA, it certainly did not deny the power of the ATCA to permit plaintiffs 
an opportunity to be heard in instances of grave violations of international 
law. And because it did not speak one way or another to the relatively 
straightforward question of whether individuals and multinational corpo-
rations can be held accountable for these violations, ATCA suits against 
multinational corporations proceed. 
B. Claims Against Multinational Corporations 
Courts have generally identified three ways that multinational corpora-
tions may be found liable under the ATCA.105 First, a corporation’s ac-
tion may be deemed “state action” if the corporation is working so close-
ly with a government that its actions in certain areas are indistinguishable 
from the actions of the government, or if the corporation assumes roles 
traditionally associated with government.106 Second, even if a corpora-
tion does not have an established relationship with a State, it may still be 
liable under the ATCA for violations of universally accepted norms.107 
For example, a private corporation that commits acts of genocide would 
be held directly liable for genocide because genocide is universally con-
                                                                                                             
their depredations were in violation of the law of nations and actionable under the 
ATCA.” Ralph G. Steinhardt, The Internationalization of Domestic Law, in THE ALIEN 
TORT CLAIMS ACT: AN ANALYTICAL ANTHOLOGY, supra note 74, at 3, 11. See also supra 
notes 69–77 and accompanying text. 
 104. These individuals were specifically found to have acted independently of the 
German government. Steinhardt, supra note 103, at 9. 
 105. There are important policy reasons for holding corporations liable for violations 
of international law. When a corporation knowingly supplies assistance to a State that 
permits the State to commit violations of international law it would not have otherwise 
been able to commit, the corporation is culpable. It significantly assisted the State in its 
perpetration of the harms. Also, because the work of a corporation often involves the 
decisions of many individuals, it can be much simpler to apportion blame to a corporation 
than a group of individuals. Anita Ramasastry, Corporate Complicity: From Nuremberg 
to Rangoon, 20 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 91, 97, 105 (2002). However, some would argue 
that a corporation should not be expected to play the role of policymaker by encouraging 
States to comply with universal human rights standards, and that placing this expectation 
upon corporations may chill foreign investment. See, e.g., Lucien J. Dhooge, A Modest 
Proposal to Amend the Alien Tort Statute to Provide Guidance to Transnational Corpo-
rations, 13 U.C. DAVIS J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 119, 134 (2007). 
 106. See infra notes 111–13 and accompanying text. 
 107. See infra notes 114–18 and accompanying text. 
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sidered an international crime. Finally, and most controversially, some 
courts have based third-party liability for private actors on differing un-
derstandings of civil liability for aiding and abetting violations of inter-
national law.108 
Many of the ATCA suits against corporations can be traced back to the 
1997 case, Doe I v. Unocal, where for the first time a district court found 
that a corporation could be held liable under the ATCA, both for certain 
violations of international law such as torture and forced labor, and for 
working in concert or as a joint venturer with the State.109 Since that de-
cision, fifty-two suits have been filed in federal courts against corporate 
defendants as of spring 2008; three were settled, thirty-three dismissed, 
and fifteen were pending.110 
A corporation will be considered a de facto state actor, and thus liable 
under the ATCA for violations of international law, when it takes action 
in areas typically performed only by a State.111 Additionally, even when 
the corporation has not taken over functions traditionally acted on by the 
State, it can be liable when it holds such a close relationship with the 
state that it is acting under color of law.112 Generally, a corporation can 
be said to be acting under “color of law” when it “maintain[s] an interde-
pendent or symbiotic relationship with the public party; when the state 
requires, encourages, or is significantly involved in nominally private 
conduct; when the private party exercises functions traditionally per-
formed by the state; or when the private parties conspire with state offi-
cials.”113 
                                                                                                             
 108. See infra note 125. 
 109. Doe I v. Unocal Corp., 963 F. Supp. 880, 891–92 (C.D. Cal. 1997). 
 110. Stephens, Unreasonable Views, supra note 84, at 814. 
 111. Gregory G.A. Tzeutschler, Corporate Violator: The Alien Tort Liability of Trans-
national Corporations for Human Rights Abuses Abroad, 30 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 
359, 389 (1999). 
 112. See, e.g., Sarei v. Rio Tinto PLC, 221 F. Supp. 2d 1116, 1148 (C.D. Cal. 2002), 
aff’d in part, vacated in part, rev’d in part, 456 F.3d 1069 (9th Cir. 2006), opinion with-
drawn and superseded in part on reh’g, 487 F.3d 1193 (9th Cir. 2006), reh’g en banc 
granted 499 F.3d 923 (9th Cir. 2007) (holding that the actions of the State of Papua New 
Guinea were “fairly attributable” to Rio Tinto given their joint action). 
 113. BETH STEPHENS & MICHAEL RATNER, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LITIGATION 
IN U.S. COURTS 97–98 (1996). An understanding of the term “color of law” in U.S. courts 
as applied to private actors comes from the courts’ interpretation of the U.S. civil rights 
statute, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2000). See Stephens, Historical Context, supra note 73, at 437 
(stating that courts that applied the principles of violations under color of law to U.S. 
civil rights statutes “paved the way for litigation against corporations”). The Supreme 
Court has applied this definition of action under color of law to determine when a private 
entity can be considered a state actor and thus liable under § 1983. See Tzeutschler, supra 
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Corporations have also been found liable under the ATCA for certain 
specific violations of international law. There is a set of carefully defined 
universal norms that bind both States and private actors.114 As the court 
in Karadzic noted, “[C]ertain forms of conduct violate the law of nations 
whether undertaken by those acting under the auspices of a state or only 
as private individuals.”115 Under treaties and customary international law, 
these norms are considered of such importance that to violate them is to 
violate international law, regardless of the identity of the transgressor.116 
Blackstone defines the law of nations as “a system of rules, deducible by 
natural reason, and established by universal consent among the civilized 
inhabitants of the world.”117 These norms may not be imprecise or vague. 
An often-cited definition provides that the laws are “universal, definable, 
and obligatory international norms.”118 
This is not to say that it is a simple task to determine what these norms 
are at any particular time. The Sosa Court provided that we should look 
to the works of jurists and commentators for evidence.119 The composi-
tion of these norms is not static. Laws that reach international consensus, 
and views among experts and legal commentators on these laws shift and 
develop over time. By the end of the nineteenth century and up until the 
twentieth, violations of international law included piracy, slave trading, 
and slavery.120 Today the list has significantly expanded.121 The Restate-
                                                                                                             
note 111, at 390–92 (describing the application of the four tests of state action to private 
entities). 
 114. See supra notes 95–98 and accompanying text. 
 115. Kadic v. Karadzic, 70 F.3d 232, 239 (2d Cir. 1995). 
 116. Steinhardt, supra note 103, at 8. 
 117. Stephens, Historical Context, supra note 73, at 446 (citing 4 WILLIAM BLACK-
STONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND *67 (Wayne Morrison ed., 2001) 
(1753)). 
 118. Forti v. Suarez-Mason, 672 F. Supp. 1531, 1540 (N.D. Cal. 1987). 
 119. Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 734 (2004). 
 120. Tzeutschler, supra note 111, at 393. 
 121. For a discussion of which torts constitute violations of international law, see, for 
example, Joel Slawotsky, Doing Business Around the World: Corporate Liability under 
the Alien Tort Claims Act, 2005 MICH. ST. L. REV. 1065, 1088–98 (2005) (concluding 
that violations actionable under the ATCA include crimes against humanity, racial dis-
crimination, slave/forced labor, torture, war crimes, and possibly cruel, inhuman, and/or 
degrading conduct, and extrajudicial killing). Slawotsky states that Sosa rejected arbitrary 
detention as a basis for an ATCA suit. Id. at 1088. This conclusion is questionable given 
that the Sosa Court was insistent that the particular facts presented did not prove a case of 
arbitrary detention: “[i]t is enough to hold that a single illegal detention of less than a 
day, followed by the transfer of custody to lawful authorities and a prompt arraignment, 
violates no norm of customary international law so well defined as to support the creation 
of a federal remedy.” Sosa, 542 U.S. at 738. For a different understanding of what torts 
are actionable under the ATCA, see Lucien J. Dhooge, Lohengrin Revealed: The Implica-
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ment (Third) of Foreign Relations Law sets forth a list of violations of 
international law by states122 to include, among other violations, “torture 
or other cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment” and “prolonged arbi-
trary detention.”123 
The final and most controversial mode for finding corporations liable 
for violations of international law is through third-party aiding and  
abetting liability. Given that most corporations do not intentionally vi-
olate international norms, for example, by directly committing acts of 
genocide, and that generally corporations are unlikely to have such in-
                                                                                                             
tions of Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain for Human Rights Litigation Pursuant to the Alien Tort 
Claims Act, 28 LOY. L.A. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 393, 493 (2006) (“The only claims as-
serted against transnational corporations surviving Sosa are those alleging summary and 
extrajudicial execution, torture, and perhaps racial discrimination.”). 
 122. The Restatement makes clear that in addition to States, individuals and corpora-
tions may be held liable for certain violations of international law: 
[I]ndividuals and private juridical entities can have any status, capacity, rights, 
or duties given them by international law or agreement, and increasingly indi-
viduals and private entities have been accorded such aspects of personality in 
varying measures. For example, international law and numerous international 
agreements now recognize human rights of individuals and sometimes give in-
dividuals remedies before international bodies . . . . Individuals may be held li-
able for offenses against international law, such as piracy, war crimes, or geno-
cide. 
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE U.S. pt. II, introductory note 
(1987) (footnotes omitted). 
 123. Id. § 702. In full, § 702 asserts: 
A state violates international law if, as a matter of state policy, it practices, en-
courages, or condones 
(a) genocide, 
(b) slavery or slave trade, 
(c) the murder or causing the disappearance of individuals, 
(d) torture or other cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment, 
(e) prolonged arbitrary detention, 
(f) systematic racial discrimination, or 
(g) a consistent pattern of gross violations of internationally recognized human 
rights. 
Comment (a) to § 702 notes, “The list is not necessarily complete, and is not closed:  
human rights not listed in this section may have achieved the status of customary law, 
and some rights might achieve that status in the future.” It is also noteworthy that this list 
was considered current as of 1987; certainly additional agreed-upon norms might have 
arisen in the last twenty years. 
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tertwined relationships with state governments as to be found acting un-
der color of law, aiding and abetting liability has received the most atten-
tion, both by legal commentators and the general business community. 
Liability for aiding and abetting under the ATCA is still a relatively new 
concept in the courts. Because Sosa declined to speak to whether indi-
viduals and corporations can be liable under the ATCA,124 the courts 
have been left to decide, as a threshold matter, whether aiding and abet-
ting liability under the ATCA exists at all125 and, if so, to select the stan-
dard by which to analyze aiding and abetting liability. 
Those arguing against corporate aiding and abetting liability126 are 
likely to point to the Supreme Court decision in Central Bank of Denver, 
N.A. v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, N.A., in which the Court found, 
“[W]hen Congress enacts a statute under which a person may sue and 
recover damages from a private defendant for the defendant’s violation 
of some statutory norm, there is no general presumption that the plaintiff 
may also sue aiders and abettors.”127 However, in Khulumani v. Barclay 
National Bank, Judge Katzmann stated in a concurring opinion that the 
holding in Central Bank is “inapposite” to ATCA claims, because the 
“relevant norm is provided not by domestic statute but by the law of  
                                                                                                             
 124. See supra notes 99–100 and accompanying text. 
 125. Post-Sosa, most courts appear to accept the notion that aiding and abetting liabili-
ty exists for individuals and corporations under the ATCA. William Paul Simmons, Lia-
bility of Secondary Actors Under the Alien Tort Statute, 10 YALE HUM. RTS. & DEV. L.J. 
88, 111 (2007). See, e.g., Cabello v. Fernandez-Larios, 402 F.3d 1148, 1157 (11th Cir. 
2005); In re “Agent Orange” Prod. Liab. Litig., 373 F. Supp. 2d 7, 51–54 (E.D.N.Y. 
2005), aff’d, 517 F.3d 104 (2d Cir. 2008). For examples of decisions in which the courts 
have declined to find aiding and abetting liability under the ATCA, see In re S. Afr. 
Apartheid Litig., 346 F. Supp. 2d 538, 550 (S.D.N.Y. 2004), aff’d in part & vacated in 
part sub nom., Khulumani v. Barclay Nat’l Bank Ltd., 504 F.3d 254 (2d Cir. 2007) (per 
curiam) (vacating the district court’s decision, aff’d due to lack of a quorum sub nom., 
Am. Isuzu Motors, Inc. v. Ntsebeza, 128 S. Ct. 2424 (2008). The district court’s decision 
in In re S. Afr. Apartheid Litig. to disallow ATCA claims under a theory of aiding and 
abetting liability was vacated by the Second Circuit in 2007. For the reasons described in 
In re S. Afr. Apartheid Litig., the court in Doe v. Exxon Mobil Corp. declined to find aid-
ing and abetting liability under the ATCA. 393 F. Supp. 2d 20, 24 (D.D.C. 2005), aff’d, 
473 F.3d 345 (D.C. Cir. 2007). Now that the Second Circuit has overturned this ruling, 
the D.C. District Court decision may have less value as precedent. 
 126. See, e.g., Curtis A. Bradley, Jack L. Goldsmith, & David H. Moore, Sosa, Custo-
mary International Law, and the Continuing Relevance of Erie, 120 HARV. L. REV. 869, 
924–29 (2007). 
 127. 511 U.S. 164, 182 (1994). The Court continued that the doctrine of civil aiding 
and abetting liability has been “at best uncertain in application.” Id. at 181. For an  
interesting analysis on how the aiding and abetting standard might be evaluated in light of 
Central Bank, see Simmons, supra note 125, at 111–14. 
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nations, and that law extends responsibility for violations of its norms to 
aiders and abettors.”128 
In In re “Agent Orange” Product Liability Litigation, Judge Weinstein 
also rejected reliance on Central Bank in determining whether aiding and 
abetting liability exists.129 Judge Weinstein referenced an amicus brief at 
length that included a cite to a 1795 opinion from the Attorney General 
stating that individuals would be liable under the ATCA for “commit-
ting, aiding, or abetting” violations of the laws of war.130 The brief also 
cited Talbot v. Jansen,131 a 1795 case in which Talbot, a French citizen, 
was found liable for the unlawful capture of a ship in violation of inter-
national law, due to his actions in “aiding Ballard[, a U.S. citizen,] to arm 
and outfit” the ship and in “cooperating with him on the high seas.”132 
Since aiding and abetting liability for violations of international law was 
proved to be in existence for over two hundred years, Judge Weinstein 
had no trouble dismissing the Central Bank argument. 
A majority of courts have found that aiding and abetting liability does 
exist under the ATCA, although the courts do not agree on the applicable 
legal standard.133 Both the federal district court and the Ninth Circuit in 
Doe I v. Unocal134 as well as the Second Circuit in Khulumani v. Barclay  
National Bank135 have articulated the standards applied by various courts 
                                                                                                             
 128. Khulumani v. Barclay Nat’l Bank Ltd., 504 F.3d at 282 (Katzmann, J., concur-
ring). 
 129. In re “Agent Orange” Prod. Liab. Litig., 373 F. Supp. 2d at 7. 
 130. Id. at 53–54 (citing Breach of Neutrality, 1 Op. Att’y Gen. 57, 59 (1795)). The 
individuals contemplated had “act[ed] in concert with” but did not “control” French naval 
ships. Id. 
 131. 3 U.S. 133 (1795). 
 132. In re “Agent Orange” Prod. Liab. Litig., 373 F. Supp. 2d at 54. 
 133. See supra note 125. 
 134. Doe I v. Unocal was the first case to hold that a multinational corporation could 
be found liable under the ATCA for violations of international law. Olah, supra note 79, 
at 774. The plaintiffs in Unocal essentially accused the defendants of aiding and abetting 
the military of Myanmar, a well-known human rights violator, in the forced labor of the 
plaintiffs. Doe I v. Unocal, 395 F.3d 932, 947 (9th Cir. 2002). Unocal had a complicated 
procedural history. In 2000, the federal district court granted summary judgment for  
Unocal. In 2002, the Ninth Circuit affirmed that decision in part and reversed it in part. 
The Ninth Circuit decided to rehear the case in 2003; however, in 2005, the case was 
settled before a decision was handed down, thus preventing the chance for the Supreme 
Court to speak on the correct standard to apply when analyzing aiding and abetting 
claims under the ATCA (assuming, of course, that aiding and abetting claims are cogniz-
able in the first place). See Doe I v. Unocal, 110 F. Supp. 2d 1294 (C.D. Cal. 2000), aff’d 
in pt., rev’d in pt., 395 F.3d 932 (9th Cir. 2002), reh’g en banc granted, 395 F.3d 978 
(9th Cir. 2003), appeal dismissed, 403 F.3d 708 (9th Cir. 2005). 
 135. 504 F.3d 254 (2d Cir. 2007) (per curiam), aff’d due to lack of a quorum sub nom., 
Am. Isuzu Motors, Inc. v. Ntsebeza, 128 S. Ct. 2424 (2008). 
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in ATCA cases. In particular, courts have alternatively employed the in-
ternational criminal aiding and abetting liability standards as applied at 
Nuremburg—more recently as developed in the ICTY and the ICTR136—
and, perhaps more infrequently, looked to federal common law tort  
principles.137 
The district court in Doe I v. Unocal used what has been called an  
“active participation” standard to judge aiding and abetting liability.138 
The court examined several U.S. Military Tribunal decisions at Nurem-
berg139 and found that because Unocal had not actively participated in 
forced labor, it could not be held liable, regardless of the fact that it was 
aware of and benefited from the military’s use of forced labor.140 Accord-
ing to the district court, “[L]iability requires participation or cooperation 
in the forced labor practices.”141 
The Ninth Circuit agreed with the district court that international law 
should be applied as set forth in international tribunal cases such as those 
at Nuremberg; however, it rejected the “active participation” standard.142 
The court’s decision to apply international law rather than domestic law 
or the law of the country where the underlying claim took place was 
based on several factors. First, because the violation in question was a jus 
cogens violation, the law of every state regarding the jus cogens violation 
must be identical to the international law standard anyway, or it is per se 
invalid.143 Second, the Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws states 
that if there is no statute in the jurisdiction that governs what law to  
apply, the court should take into account “the needs of the interstate and 
international systems,” “certainty, predictability and uniformity of re-
                                                                                                             
 136. See infra notes 138–49 and accompanying text. 
 137. See infra notes 150–53 and accompanying text. 
 138. Simmons, supra note 125, at 108. 
 139. See Unocal, 110 F. Supp. 2d at 1309–10. For further discussion of several U.S. 
Military Tribunal cases against German industrialists, see infra Part III. 
 140. Unocal, 110 F. Supp. 2d at 1310. 
 141. Id. The court continued, “The Tribunal’s guilty verdict rested not on the defen-
dants’ knowledge and acceptance of benefits of the forced labor, but on their active  
participation in the unlawful conduct.” Id. The district court characterized the plaintiff’s 
position as arguing that “knowledge and approval of acts is sufficient for a finding of 
liability.” Id. at 1309. In retrospect, it was probably a mistake for the plaintiffs to argue 
for such a broad rule, given that ATCA litigation in the area of holding multinational 
corporations liable for aiding and abetting was so new to the courts at the time. 
 142. The Ninth Circuit majority states that the “active participation” standard was only 
employed in the Nuremberg trials in order to rebut the “necessity defense” invoked by the 
defendants. The court goes on to say that the necessity defense is inapplicable in Unocal, 
so the active participation standard is also inapplicable. Doe I v. Unocal, 395 F.3d 932, 
947–48 (9th Cir. 2002). 
 143. Id. at 948. 
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sult,” and “ease in the determination and application of the law to be ap-
plied,”144 all of which point to the desirability of applying international 
law. Finally, the court stated that by applying international law, the  
underlying policy goal of the statute—“provid[ing] tort remedies for vi-
olations of international law”145—is served. 
Interestingly, the court did not find it problematic to apply internation-
al criminal law standards to international civil law claims, in part because 
international human rights law “has been developed largely in the con-
text of criminal prosecutions rather than civil proceedings,”146 thus mak-
ing criminal law standards the most applicable in ATCA cases. The court 
also noted that a separation of criminal and tort claims is often artificial: 
[W]hat is a crime in one jurisdiction is often a tort in another jurisdic-
tion, and this distinction is therefore of little help in ascertaining the 
standards of international human rights law. Moreover, . . . the standard 
for aiding and abetting in international criminal law is similar to the 
standard for aiding and abetting in domestic tort law, making the dis-
tinction between criminal and tort law less crucial in this context. Ac-
cordingly, District Courts are increasingly turning to the decisions by 
                                                                                                             
 144. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 6 (1971). See also Unocal, 395 
F.3d at 948. It is not necessarily true, however, that applying international law to aiding 
and abetting civil claims will lead to certainty and predictability. As this section demon-
strates, there is no settled standard for international aiding and abetting claims. Bradley, 
Goldsmith, and Moore point out that the Rome Statute of the International Criminal 
Court may have set forth a “more demanding” standard than the ICTY. See Bradley, 
Goldsmith, & Moore, supra note 126, at 927. While the ICTY developed a standard of 
“knowingly providing practical assistance, encouragement or moral support that has a 
substantial effect on the commission of the crime,” see infra note 148, the Rome Statute’s 
General Principles state that “a person shall be criminally responsible and liable for pu-
nishment for a crime within the jurisdiction of the Court if that person . . . [f]or the pur-
pose of facilitating the commission of such a crime, aids, abets or otherwise assists in its 
commission or its attempted commission, including providing the means for its commis-
sion . . . .” Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court art. 25(3)(c), July 17, 1999, 
2187 U.N.T.S. 90 (emphasis added). Some support for using the Rome Statute to define 
aiding and abetting liability may be emerging. In his concurrence in Khulumani, Judge 
Katzmann points to the Rome Statute as “particularly significant,” because it “articulates 
the mens rea required for aiding and abetting liability.” Khulumani v. Barclay Nat’l Bank 
Ltd., 504 F.3d 254, 275 (2d Cir. 2007) (Katzmann, J., concurring). But some scholars 
reject using the Rome Statute as a useful source for the definition because it “fails to 
incorporate any requirements for finding causation” and fails to “reflect[ or] declare[] 
customary international law.” Anthony J. Sebok, Taking Tort Law Seriously in the Alien 
Tort Statute, 33 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 871, 884–85 (2008). 
 145. Unocal, 395 F.3d at 949. The court, however, does not make clear why providing 
a tort remedy for violations of international law by applying domestic law would not 
serve the policy goals of the ATCA. Id. 
 146. Id. 
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international criminal tribunals for instructions regarding the standards 
of international human rights law under our civil ATCA.147 
Analyzing ICTR and ICTY cases, the court found that the correct stan-
dard to apply is one of “knowing practical assistance or encouragement 
that has a substantial effect on the perpetration of the crime.”148 The ac-
tus reus requires showing “practical assistance or encouragement which 
has a substantial effect on the perpetration of the crime”; the mens rea 
requires showing “actual or constructive (i.e., reasonable) knowledge 
that the accomplice’s actions will assist the perpetrator in the commis-
sion of the crime.”149 
In his concurring opinion in Unocal, Judge Reinhardt suggested  
instead that “federal common law tort principles, such as agency, joint 
venture, or reckless disregard” should be applied.150 He rejected applying 
international law standards out of hand, stating that they are “recently-
promulgated”151 and “permit[] imposition of liability for the lending of 
                                                                                                             
 147. Id. (citations omitted). See also Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 762–63 
(2004) (Breyer, J., concurring) (stating that there is no reason to fail to extend adjudica-
tion to a particular nation’s court of a claim concerning alien civil conduct in violation of 
international law, given the fact that there is universal consensus to allow any nation’s 
court to adjudicate alien criminal conduct that violates international law). 
 148. Unocal, 395 F.3d at 947, 950–51. The Human Rights Council, tasked with setting 
forth human rights standards of corporate responsibility and accountability, incorporated 
essentially the same standard used by the majority in the Ninth Circuit decision, with the 
exception that the Council also included “moral support,” which the majority in Unocal 
did not address. See infra note 152. Citing two cases from the ICTY, the Council stated, 
“The international tribunals have developed a fairly clear standard for individual criminal 
aiding and abetting liability: knowingly providing practical assistance, encouragement or 
moral support that has a substantial effect on the commission of the crime.” Human 
Rights Council, Report of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General on the 
Issue of Human Rights and Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises, 
para. 31, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/4/035 (Feb. 19, 2007). The Council noted, however, that it is 
“unknown” whether the International Criminal Court will adopt the same standard. Id. 
para. 31 n.28. 
 149. Unocal, 395 F.3d at 952–53. 
 150. Id. at 963 (Reinhardt, J., concurring). 
 151. Id. Certainly the decisions of the ICTY and the ICTR occurred relatively recently, 
but the tribunals’ conclusions about the standard for aiding and abetting liability came 
from what the majority called an “exhaustive analysis of international case law and inter-
national instruments,” primarily from those that arose after World War II. See id. at 950 
n.26. And as explained above, aiding and abetting liability for violations of international 
law dates back to the adoption of the ATCA. See supra notes 130–31 and accompanying 
text. This “new” standard, then, is actually a synthesis of courts’ understanding of crimi-
nal aiding and abetting developed over many years. 
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moral support.”152 Similarly, in Khulumani, Judge Hall declared that the 
courts should review federal common law when examining a claim of 
accessory liability.153 But this view has not captured the support of a ma-
jority in the federal courts, perhaps in part because the Supreme Court 
may have implied that applying international law is appropriate in these 
cases.154 
III. AIDING AND ABETTING LIABILITY AT NUREMBERG 
A. Introduction 
While no one definitive standard of aiding and abetting liability under 
the ATCA has arisen in the courts, courts and commentators in the Unit-
ed States have been moving toward applying an international standard of 
civil liability rather than a federal common law standard.155 Because aiding 
and abetting liability for violations of international law is not governed by 
treaty, it is especially important to examine the rule of law as developed 
in international legal decisions.156 In particular, the aiding and abetting 
standard developed in the trials at Nuremberg is worthy of notice. 
The war crimes trials at Nuremberg were an early and important attempt 
by an international body to hold individuals responsible for complicity in 
breaches of international law. The United Nations validated this effort 
when the General Assembly endorsed the establishment of the Interna-
tional Military Tribunal and generally affirmed the principles of interna-
tional law as recognized in the Charter of the Nuremberg Tribunal.157 
                                                                                                             
 152. Unocal, 395 F.3d at 963 (Reinhardt, J., concurring). As the majority points out, 
the “moral support” element from the ICTY aiding and abetting standard is not incorpo-
rated in the standard the Ninth Circuit adopts. See id. at 949 n.24. Nor was it necessary to 
even determine whether “moral support” is settled international law or if it has parallels 
in domestic law, since it was found that Unocal could be liable for having knowingly 
provided practical assistance and encouragement to the Myanmar military. Id. at 951. 
 153. Khulumani v. Barclay Nat’l Bank Ltd., 504 F.3d 254, 284 (2d Cir. 2007) (Hall, J., 
concurring). Specifically, Judge Hall looked to § 876(b) of the Restatement (Second) of 
Torts. Id. at 287. 
 154. See, e.g., Xuncax v. Gramajo, 886 F. Supp. 162, 183 (D. Mass. 1995) (explaining 
that municipal tort law is an “inadequate placeholder” to address international human 
rights violations). 
 155. “[The Supreme Court’s decision in Sosa] . . . seem[s] to suggest that whatever 
liability standard is appropriate for a given norm should be derived from international law 
rather than domestic law.” Olah, supra note 79, at 771. See also Khulumani, 504 F.3d at 
269 (Katzmann, J., concurring) (“We have repeatedly emphasized that the scope of the 
ATCA’s jurisdictional grant should be determined by reference to international law.”). 
 156. See supra note 98. 
 157. Affirmation of the Principles of International Law Recognized by the Charter of 
the Nürnberg Tribunal, G.A. Res. 95(I), U.N. Doc. A/64/Add.1, at 188 (1946). 
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The Nuremberg Charter authorized the Tribunal to prosecute not only 
individuals, but also legal persons, so corporations could be found crimi-
nally liable.158 Under the Charter, the Tribunal could declare that groups 
and organizations were “criminal organizations” at trial.159 
After the Allied Powers defeated Germany, the United States, Great 
Britain, France, and the U.S.S.R. formed a Control Council to institute 
uniform procedures for the trials of war criminals.160 The crimes to be 
prosecuted were set forth in Article 6 of the Nuremberg Charter and  
included crimes against peace, war crimes, and crimes against humani-
ty.161 The Control Council passed Law No. 10, which specifically pro-
vided: 
                                                                                                             
 158. Beth Stephens, Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain: “The Door is Still Ajar” For Human 
Rights Litigation in U.S. Courts, 70 BROOK. L. REV. 533, 557 & n.115 (2005). See also 
Jonathan Clough, Punishing the Parent: Corporate Criminal Complicity in Human 
Rights Abuses, 33 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 899, 913 (2008) (stating that holding corporations 
criminally liable is a “relatively recent phenomenon” that came about in response to the 
rise of corporations during the industrial revolution). 
 159. “At the trial of any individual member of any group or organization the Tribunal 
may declare (in connection with any act of which the individual may be convicted) that 
the group or organization of which the individual was a member was a criminal organiza-
tion.” Charter of the International Military Tribunal art. 9, Aug. 8, 1945, 82 U.N.T.S. 280 
[hereinafter IMT Charter]. 
 160. Ramasastry, supra note 105, at 105. Tribunals held by the other Allied Powers 
also demonstrate the existence of aiding and abetting liability for violations of interna-
tional law. See, e.g., In re Tesch, “The Zyklon B Case,” 1 LAW REPORTS OF TRIALS OF 
WAR CRIMINALS 93 (Brit. Mil. Ct. 1946) (finding business owner and second-in-
command guilty for knowingly supplying poison gas to the Nazis for use in the concen-
tration camps). 
 161. “Crimes against peace” were defined as “planning, preparation, initiation or  
waging of a war of aggression, or a war in violation of international treaties, agreements 
or assurances, or participation in a Common Plan or Conspiracy for the accomplishment 
of any of the foregoing.” IMT Charter, supra note 159, art. 6. “War crimes” were  
defined as “violations of the laws or customs of war.” Id. 
Such violations [of the laws or customs of war] shall include, but not be limited 
to, murder, ill-treatment or deportation to slave labor or for any other purpose 
of civilian population of or in occupied territory, murder or ill-treatment of 
prisoners of war or persons on the seas, killing of hostages, plunder of public or 
private property, wanton destruction of cities, towns, or villages, or devastation 
not justified by military necessity. 
Id. Finally, “crimes against humanity” were defined as: 
[M]urder, extermination, enslavement, deportation, and other inhumane acts 
committed against any civilian population, before or during the war, or perse-
cutions on political, racial, or religious grounds in execution of or in connection 
with any crime within the jurisdiction of the Tribunal, whether or not in viola-
tion of domestic law of the country where perpetrated. 
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Any person without regard to nationality or the capacity in which he 
acted, is deemed to have committed a crime . . . if he was (a) a principal 
or (b) was an accessory to the commission of any such crime or ordered 
or abetted the same or (c) took a consenting part therein or (d) was 
connected with plans or enterprises involving its commission . . . .162 
Thus, the law unambiguously provided for liability for third-party  
actors. The United States itself set up six military tribunals to try these 
crimes.163 
Trials of certain German industrialists under these U.S. Military Tri-
bunals demonstrate how this aiding and abetting standard was applied to 
individuals whose businesses profited from gross violations of interna-
tional law. Businesses could not avert prosecution solely because a dicta-
tor conceived of the plan to violate international law and the businesses 
played no role in the initial planning: 
Hitler could not make aggressive war by himself. He had to have the 
co-operation of statesmen, military leaders, diplomats, and business 
men. When they, with knowledge of his aims, gave him their co-
operation, they made themselves parties to the plan he had initiated. 
They are not to be deemed innocent because Hitler made use of them, if 
they knew what they were doing.164 
These trials at Nuremberg shed light on how courts today might apply an 
aiding and abetting standard of liability to multinational corporations. 
B. The Flick Case 
Frederick Flick, a prominent businessman in the coal and steel industry 
in Germany, and five of his business associates were each charged with 
participation in the Nazi slave labor program.165 Neither Flick nor his 
associates arranged or organized the slave labor used in his plants. As the 
tribunal noted, “[T]he slave-labor program had its origin in Reich go-
vernmental circles and was a governmental program, and . . . the defen-
dants had no part in creating or launching the program. . . . [T]he defen-
dants had no actual control of the administration of such program even 
                                                                                                             
Id. 
 162. Control Council Law No. 10, in TELFORD TAYLOR, FINAL REPORT TO THE 
SECRETARY OF THE ARMY ON THE NUERNBERG WAR CRIMES TRIALS UNDER CONTROL 
COUNCIL LAW NO. 10 app. D, at 251 (1949). 
 163. Ramasastry, supra note 160, at 105. 
 164. United States v. Goering, Nuremberg Tribunal, 6 F.R.D. 69, 112 (1947). 
 165. United States v. Friedrich Flick, “The Flick Case,” 6 TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS 
BEFORE THE NUREMBERG MILITARY TRIBUNALS UNDER CONTROL COUNCIL LAW NO. 10, 
at 1190 (1952). 
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when it affected their own plants.”166 The businessmen argued the affir-
mative defense of necessity to the charge.167 The court accepted this de-
fense for four of the six defendants. The defendants were “conscious of 
the fact that it was both futile and dangerous to object” to the use of slave 
labor.168 However, because Bernhard Weiss, one of the defendants, had 
taken “active steps” to procure further slave labor for production with the 
“knowledge and approval” of Flick, both Flick and Weiss were found 
guilty.169 
C. The Krupp Case 
The defendants in the Krupp case were businessmen in the coal and 
steel industry as well; their company, Fried. Krupp, A.G., produced large 
amounts of artillery and naval units for the Nazi regime.170 Like the  
defendants in the Flick case, they were accused of employing slave labor, 
and they also pled the defense of necessity.171 The court rejected this  
defense, because it found that the company “manifested not only its wil-
lingness but its ardent desire to employ forced labor.”172 As evidence, the 
court cited numerous pieces of correspondence in which Fried. Krupp, 
A.G. expressed its desire for new slave laborers.173 This result is not nec-
essarily incompatible with the result in the Flick case, because the court 
presented the proactive steps taken by the company to procure slave la-
bor rather than what seems to be characterized in the Flick case as a pas-
sive acceptance of the labor.174 
                                                                                                             
 166. Id. at 1196. 
 167. The court described “necessity” as “a defense when it is shown that the act 
charged was done to avoid an evil both serious and irreparable; that there was no other 
adequate means of escape; and that the remedy was not disproportioned to the evil.” Id. at 
1200 (citing 1 WHARTON’S CRIMINAL LAW para. 126). 
 168. Id. at 1197. 
 169. Id. at 1202. 
 170. United States v. Alfried Felix Alwyn Krupp von Bohlen und Halbach, “The 
Krupp Case,” 9 TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS BEFORE THE NUREMBERG MILITARY 
TRIBUNALS UNDER CONTROL COUNCIL LAW NO. 10, at 7–11 (1950). 
 171. Id. at 1435. 
 172. Id. at 1440. See also United States v. Carl Krauch, “The Farben Case,” 8 TRIALS 
OF WAR CRIMINALS BEFORE THE NUREMBERG MILITARY TRIBUNALS UNDER CONTROL 
COUNCIL LAW NO. 10, at 1179 (1952) (finding certain members of I.G. Farben, a chemi-
cal and pharmaceutical company, guilty for using slave labor and rejecting their defense 
of necessity because they were “to a very substantial degree, responsible for broadening 
the scope of that reprehensible system”). 
 173. The Krupp Case, supra note 170, at 1439–42. 
 174. The tribunal in Krupp, however, did not look at whether each individual defen-
dant had taken proactive steps to procure slave labor. The tribunal in Flick, on the other 
hand, examined whether each individual defendant had taken steps to procure slave labor, 
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D. The Einsatzgruppe Case 
Waldemar Klingelhoefer was accused of various war crimes and 
crimes against humanity.175 He maintained that his only role within the 
“Einsatzgruppe,” or special task force, was limited to interpreting.176 The 
court stated that even if this were true, “it would not exonerate him from 
guilt . . . .”177 During trial, Klingelhoefer admitted to turning over lists of 
Communists to his department, and to knowing that, by turning over the 
lists, those persons would be executed. “In this function,” said the court, 
“he served as an accessory to the crime.”178 Klingelhoefer, then, could 
not escape criminal responsibility for having played a substantial role in 
the deaths of these individuals, even if he did not participate or was not  
present as a witness when they were killed. 
E. Conclusion 
The standard emerging for aiding and abetting liability in both civil 
ATCA trials and criminal international tribunal cases is derived directly 
from Nuremburg.179 The trials at Nuremberg established that an  
individual is liable when he or she provides assistance that substantially 
affects the perpetration of the violation of international law, and knows 
that such assistance will assist in the violation. This “knowledge and  
substantial assistance” standard does not require that the aider and  
abettor desired or wanted the particular crime or breach of international 
law to occur (though an individual may be excused if under compulsion 
or coercion).180 At Nuremberg, being a willing participant in a violation 
of international law was enough for liability. The steel, coal, chemical, 
and armament companies may have regarded the assistance they pro-
vided as simply a business opportunity, and they may or may not have 
looked upon what the Nazis did with horror and distaste, but because 
they provided significant assistance to the Nazis in carrying out their en-
slavement plans, and they had knowledge of the enslavement, they de-
served punishment. 
                                                                                                             
as Weiss had, or supervised and approved the actions of those who procured the labor, as 
Flick had. See The Flick Case, supra note 165, at 1197–202. 
 175. United States v. Otto Ohlendorf, “The Einsatzgruppe Case,” 4 TRIALS OF WAR 
CRIMINALS BEFORE THE NUREMBERG MILITARY TRIBUNALS UNDER CONTROL COUNCIL 
LAW NO. 10, at 13–22 (1950). 
 176. Id. at 569. 
 177. Id. 
 178. Id. 
 179. Nuremberg was the first international effort to delineate jus cogens norms. See 
Siderman de Blake v. Republic of Argentina, 965 F.2d 699, 715 (9th Cir. 1992). 
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The Nuremberg standard of aiding and abetting liability continues to 
be developed in courts today, most notably in the international tribunals 
in the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda.180 By finding aiding and abetting 
liability, the Nuremberg tribunals, the ICTR and the ICTY, and many 
federal courts have implicitly rejected assertions such as the following, 
which was made by a corporate executive and cited by the Ninth Circuit 
in Doe I v. Unocal: 
By stating that I could not guarantee that the army is not using forced 
labour, I certainly imply that they might, (and they might) but I am  
saying that we do not have to monitor army’s behavior: we have our  
responsibilities; they have their responsibilities; and we refuse to be 
pushed into assuming more than what we can really guarantee. About 
forced labour used by the troops assigned to provide security on our 
pipeline project, let us admit between Unocal and [its subcontractor 
corporation] Total that we might be in a grey zone.181 
When a corporation knows that a serious violation of international law is 
occurring, and it provides practical assistance that substantially affects 
that violation, the corporation should be held liable under the ATCA. 182 
IV. WANG’S LIKELIHOOD OF SUCCESS 
 
Wang accused Yahoo of aiding and abetting torture, cruel, inhuman, 
and degrading treatment, and prolonged arbitrary detention, certainly in 
                                                                                                             
 180. See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Musema, Case No. ICTR-96-13-T, Judgment and Sen-
tence (Jan. 27, 2000); Prosecutor v. Furundzija, Case No. IT-95-17/1-T, Judgment (Dec. 
10, 1998). Many U.S. federal courts have acknowledged the influence of international 
tribunals in determining the definition and scope of the most serious violations of interna-
tional law. See, e.g., Doe I v. Unocal, 395 F.3d 932, 950 (9th Cir. 2002) (finding the 
ICTR and the ICTY “especially helpful” in considering the standard to use for civil aid-
ing and abetting liability). For an overview of the critiques of the use of Nuremberg 
precedent in ATCA litigation (and responses to these critiques), see Gwynne Skinner, 
Nuremberg’s Legacy Continues: The Nuremberg Trials’ Influence on Human Rights 
Litigation in U.S. Courts Under the Alien Tort Statute, 71 ALB. L. REV. 321, 353–66 
(2008). 
 181. Unocal, 395 F.3d at 942. Certainly Unocal could not direct the military’s actions 
in employing forced labor, but the company knew that grave human rights violations 
were occurring in Myanmar and was eventually informed that these violations were also 
occurring in connection with the Unocal project. See id. at 939–42. The Nuremberg  
standard would impose liability where the company is aware of the serious violations and 
provides substantive assistance for their accomplishment. 
 182. The principles of law set forth by the Nuremberg tribunals are “significant not 
only because they have garnered broad acceptance, but also because they were viewed as 
reflecting and crystallizing preexisting customary international law.” Khulumani v.  
Barclay Nat’l Bank Ltd., 504 F.3d 254, 271 (2d Cir. 2007) (Katzmann, J., concurring). 
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part because by international consensus these violations are considered 
so serious that they apply to individuals and corporations as well as 
States.183 If the court had applied the same aiding and abetting standard 
established at Nuremberg and developed by the ICTY and the ICTR,184 
Wang would have needed to show first that Yahoo provided practical 
assistance or encouragement to the Chinese government that substantial-
ly affected the torture, cruel treatment, and arbitrary detention Wang ex-
perienced at the hands of the government. Wang would have also needed 
to show that Yahoo had actual or reasonable knowledge that its actions 
would assist the Chinese government in committing these violations. 
The practical assistance prong of the aiding and abetting analysis 
would have been less difficult to demonstrate for Wang; unless Yahoo 
could have shown that the government retrieved or could have retrieved 
the information on Wang’s identity elsewhere, it is likely that Yahoo’s 
provision of such information on request would have been considered 
practical assistance with a substantial effect on the violations of interna-
tional law. Imputing knowledge to Yahoo might have proven more diffi-
cult. In Doe I v. Unocal, the Ninth Circuit provided a useful list of the 
types of evidence that could have been used to impute actual or reasona-
ble knowledge to Yahoo: a risk assessment provided by an outside con-
sulting group to the corporation, evaluating the practices of the govern-
ment in connection with the company’s project; a statement from a cor-
porate executive that the government might go outside the boundaries of 
international law; warnings and confirmations from human rights groups 
that the government was violating international law in connection with 
the corporation’s business in the country; information received from a 
consultant confirming the “egregious” violations; and receipt of docu-
ments generally circulated from the State Department on the country’s 
violations of international law.185 
Yahoo would have probably argued that the Unocal case was distin-
guishable from Wang’s. International human rights groups and even the 
consultants it had hired told Unocal that the Myanmar military was mak-
ing use of forced labor on Unocal’s project while the project was still 
ongoing.186 Yahoo, on the other hand, was not made aware that turning 
over Wang’s name would result in Wang’s imprisonment, torture, and 
humiliating treatment. Yahoo also might have argued that businesses 
                                                                                                             
 183. See supra notes 121–23 and accompanying text. 
 184. For an overview of the similarities and differences between modern international 
tribunals and the tribunals set up at Nuremberg, see Theodor Meron, Reflections on the 
Prosecution of War Crimes by International Tribunals, 100 AM. J. INT’L L. 551 (2006). 
 185. Unocal, 395 F.3d at 940–42. 
 186. Id. at 941–42. 
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cannot control the actions of a repressive government. Some courts may 
be sympathetic to an argument that a chilling effect on business invest-
ments outside the United States could occur if a claim like this is allowed 
to proceed187; however, courts would probably not be sympathetic to an 
argument that Yahoo’s only motive in doing business in China was prof-
it, and that it had no malevolent intent. The Nuremberg tribunals found 
such motive no excuse.188 
The liability of Yahoo would have most likely turned on how narrowly the 
court defined the “knowledge” prong of the aiding and abetting analysis. If 
knowledge could have been imputed from information known to the gen-
eral public, for example, that China’s government represses dissidents, 
and that in doing business in China, Yahoo might have been required to 
turn over some information on its customers (for known or unknown 
purposes), then Yahoo would have certainly been liable. However, if the 
court had required Yahoo to know specifically that by turning over 
Wang’s identifying information, he would be jailed, tortured, and sub-
jected to cruel and degrading treatment, Yahoo’s liability would have 
been unlikely. A middle-of-the-road “knowledge” standard would require 
Yahoo to know specifically that it had turned over Wang’s account infor-
mation due to his dissemination of “state secrets,” but not that giving the 
information would result in Wang’s torture and imprisonment. 
CONCLUSION AND A PROPOSAL FOR THE AIDING AND ABETTING CIVIL 
LIABILITY STANDARD FOR MULTINATIONAL CORPORATIONS 
If the court had employed this middle standard, it is likely that the 
court would have ruled in Wang’s favor. Critically, the General Counsel 
of Yahoo informed Congress that the request for Wang’s identification 
from the Chinese government contained reference to “state secrets,” a 
term widely known to mean a search for information on dissidents. Yahoo 
apparently complied without a second thought. Additionally, the fact that 
                                                                                                             
 187. Indeed, the Bush administration has argued in amicus briefs filed in ten different 
ATCA cases that ATCA litigation interferes with foreign policy. See Stephens,  
Unreasonable Views, supra note 84, at 773–74. The Bush administration has strenuously 
objected to the existence of aiding and abetting liability under the ATCA and argues that 
if aiding and abetting liability were to be found, investments by both U.S. and non-U.S. 
businesses in developing countries would decrease, undermining political and economical 
stability in those countries, with harm resulting to the United States. Id. at 792–93.  
Stephens argues that the administration’s position should be rejected because it fails to 
prove a correlation between the acts at issue in the lawsuit and the “dangers predicted.” 
Id. at 800–01. Stephens continues that the arguments upon which the administration relies 
are “patently absurd.” Id. at 802. 
 188. See, e.g., The Flick Case, supra note 165. 
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the suit was filed in a district court in California, where appeals eventual-
ly go to the same circuit court that decided Unocal, might have made a 
decision in Wang’s favor more likely. But Unocal was decided before 
the Sosa decision, so whether the court would have applied a different 
aiding and abetting standard is unclear, given that Sosa did not address 
the aiding and abetting issue specifically. Finally, for a corporation as 
large and sophisticated as Yahoo, it is likely that the discovery process 
would have revealed that Yahoo understood the implications its actions 
posed for one similarly situated to Wang. Yahoo likely employed many 
consultants to assess the risks before venturing into business in China. It 
is hard to imagine that Yahoo would not have been aware that it might be 
required to turn over identifying information to the Chinese government 
as a condition of doing business there.189 Prominent human rights organi-
zations have also been active in putting companies and States on notice 
about the practices of the Chinese government that violate established 
standards of international law.190 
While liability for Yahoo would not have been clear-cut, and it is not 
even necessarily clear that the court would have used the internationally 
developed standard for criminal aiding and abetting, it was probably wise 
that Yahoo settled, given the negative attention from Congress, the me-
dia, and human rights groups. It will be interesting to find out how the 
settlement of the case informs how Yahoo decides to handle requests 
from the Chinese government in the future. Yahoo without question now 
has knowledge of what could happen to its customers when the company 
turns over information on individuals accused of disseminating “state 
secrets.” 
Since Karadzic and Unocal were decided, most courts facing the issue 
have found that corporations may be held liable under the ATCA for aid-
ing and abetting. It might be fair to say that for a majority of courts and 
commentators, the question is no longer whether corporations should be 
held liable for aiding and abetting. Rather, the question is when should 
corporations be held liable for aiding and abetting. The practical conse-
quences of the resolution of this question are far-reaching, so it is important 
that, in setting the standard, courts consider not only the relevance of 
international law—after all, international law is a part of the federal 
common law—but also that corporations should not be held accountable 
                                                                                                             
 189. Indeed, Google was so concerned about this possibility that it declined to provide 
email services when commencing business in China. See Thompson, supra note 12. 
 190. See, e.g., Amnesty International, Reports, News Articles, and Campaigns on Hu-
man Rights in China, http://www.amnesty.org/en/region/china (last visited Nov. 10, 
2008); Human Rights Watch, Press Releases, Letters, Reports, and Commentary on Hu-
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for the sins of their business partners in every instance in which the part-
ners breach established standards of international law. Repressive gov-
ernments are not necessarily predictable, much less stable, and corpora-
tions that want to do business globally should not be expected to forecast 
suppression of dissent by means that are illegal under international 
norms. A “knowledge” standard for aiding and abetting, then, should not 
be so narrowly defined that it would impute knowledge to a corporation 
for merely knowing, without more, that a government with whom it 
works has repressive tendencies. But if a corporation provides substantial 
assistance to a State that allows the State to more easily carry out oppres-
sion against its citizens in breach of international law, with knowledge 
that this oppression would likely follow from its assistance, that corpora-
tion should be on notice that it may be held liable in U.S. courts for vi-
olations under the ATCA. Finding corporations responsible for substan-
tial assistance to governments that seriously violate international law 
upholds the legacy of the war crimes trials at Nuremberg. 
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